Abstract-It is common for a retailer to sell products from competing manufacturers. How then should the firms manage their contract negotiations? Different from market structures researched before, contracts serve as a tool for competition tools rather than coordinating the whole supply chain in our paper. We study our models between competing manufacturers who sell symmetric products, and a common retailer facing stochastic demand. We allow the manufacturers to compete for the retailer's business using one of two types of contracts, a wholesale-price contract, a buyback contract. We find that some key conclusions of our settings are inconsistent in other market structures discussed before. We show that in our market structure the buyback contract forces the manufacturers to compete more aggressively than when they only offer wholesaleprice contracts, and this may leave them worse off and the retailer substantially better off.
.
INTRODUCTION
The literature on supply chain coordination has studied several contractual forms in settings with a single manufacturer and one or more retailers. One of the key results from this literature is that wholesale-price contracts lead to suboptimal decisions for the supply chain (i.e., double marginalization) and more sophisticated contracts (like buyback contracts) can be employed to achieve both channel coordination (i.e., maximize the supply chain's profit) and rent extraction (i.e., the ability to allocate a high share of the profits to the manufacturer) that leaves the retailer with her reservation profit. Hence, a retailer may have just cause to fear buyback contracts. But in our settings, a retailer may actually prefer buyback contracts. Our objective in this paper is to test this conclusion in a setting in which multiple manufacturers compete to sell their symmetric products through a single retailer such as fig. 1 .
In our model, the retailer faces stochastic demand. Two manufacturers simultaneously offer to the retailer one of two types of contracts: a wholesale-price contract, a buyback contract (i.e., a per unit payment the retailer for unsold products). The retailer sets her demands and prices to maximize her total profit given the offered contracts and her costs.
As researched in most papers, the retailer's reservation profit is assumed to be an exogenous constant that reflects the retailer's bargaining power -an increase in the retailer's bargaining power is modeled by increasing the retailer's reservation profit. However, in our structure with two manufacturers, the retailer's reservation profit is endogenousthe profit the retailer can earn if it were to reject manufacturer A's offer depends on what manufacturer B offers, and viceversa. This distinction is significant and, as we demonstrate, important for our findings. Furthermore, competition between the manufacturers serves to raise the retailer's reservation profits. The present paper is foremost a commentary on the supply chain coordination literature [1] .addition to the coordination scheme by using buyback contract, it may achieve collaborative forecasts under asymmetric demand information [2] . Compared to the large body of research on vertical interactions (through supply contracts) among supply chain partners, horizontal competition has received only limited attention. Under stochastic demand, horizontal competition has been studied in single-product distribution networks [1] [3], multiple-product distribution networks [4] . [5] [6] analyzed assembly networks with a deterministic, price-quantity linear relationship and no capacity constraints, respectively focusing on supply network design and coordination mechanisms with supply contracts. [7] [8]do study systems with multiple manufacturers and a common retailer, but [7] only considers wholesale-price contract and [8] considers quantity discounts under deterministic demand.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section describes the model. Section presents our analysis of the retailer's problem, Section the analysis of the wholesale and buyback games of the manufacturers' problem, and Section comparison of the equilibrium under the wholesale and buyback contracts, Section concludes the paper.
. THE MODEL There are two products in the market supplied by two different manufacturers. The products are partial substitutes and are sold through a common retailer. In the first stage of the game, the manufacturers simultaneously announce the payment schemes for their products. In the second stage, the retailer chooses prices, which determine the products demand rates, to maximize her profit. In addition to the payments to the manufacturer, the retailer incurs operating costs . The manufacturers incur constant marginal production costs.
Suppose 
We consider two different types of contracts. With a wholesale-price contract, the payment function is ( )
T Q wQ , where i w is the wholesale price chosen by manufacturer i .
We include the following set of buyback contracts: Wholesale-price contracts are a subset of our buyback contracts-a buyback price with i b =0 is a wholesale-price contract.
For expositional simplicity, we discuss symmetric products condition in which the symmetric products are provided by competing manufacturers. So a symmetric game across manufacturers means that the data for the two products are identical, i.e., , , , . These profit levels are respectively the maximum profit the system earns, if it were to carry only product 1, only product 2 and both products. We assume 12 i 0 for i =1 2, which implies that it is always optimal for the system to carry both products under symmetric game. Define For a symmetric problem, it follows from the above argument that the unique interior optimal solution is on the The second derivation of (8) (6)
